

ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE CARIBBEAN AND THE LATIN AMERICAN REGION

PA BOURNE^{*}, MS PETERKIN^{*}, RONALD ANDERSON^{},
MARSHA PABARUE^{*}, DAVE HIGGINS^{*}**

ABSTRACT

Empirical evidence exists which showed that transnational criminal networks like Shower Posse wreaked havoc on Jamaican society as well as impacted many other nations. Many transnational organised crime syndicates use their economic base to weaken governance structures, terrorize communities, increase psychological fear, murder rivals and enemies, launder money, corrupt public officials, and weaken internal democracy. The objectives of the current study are: 1) To evaluate transnational organized crimes in the Caribbean with some reference to other jurisdictions, and 2) To determine strategies that can be used to lower, curtail and likely address transnational organized crime in the Caribbean regions. For this work phenomenology was used to examine transnational organized crimes. Within the context of the economics of crime, without addressing the economic vulnerability of people with nations, it will be increasingly difficult to solve criminal operations in the long-term. The new measures instituted and that will be formulated to address some of the challenges identified in this research will be shifted in the future if the general economic vulnerability within the state is not addressed.

KEYWORDS: Caribbean, Latin America, Organized Crime, Transnational Organized Crime.

INTRODUCTION

Crime in the Caribbean had reached an alarming proportion and called for some crime prevention mechanisms and governmental interventions. Civil society was not excluded from various bodies called upon to actively forward measures that could address the crime pandemic that had swept through the society. In 1998, this prompted a conference which was hosted in Barbados on 'Crime and Criminal Justice in the

Caribbean' in order to ascertain measures, policies, programmes, and interventions that could be instituted to remedy the crime pandemic (Harriott, 2004, viii). Harriott (2004) contended that "The problem of crime in the Caribbean-its causes, it consequences, and its control-emerged as a major concern during the 1990s"(p. 1).

^{*} Northern Caribbean University, Jamaica.

^{**} Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), Jamaica.

Correspondence E-mail Id: editor@eurekajournals.com

He went on to state that crime and HIV/AIDS “are wreaking havoc on our population” (p. 1), suggesting that the crime pandemic is polarizing many peoples and therefore must be addressed with urgency (See also, Stone, 1987, 1988; Gray, 2003; Harriott, 2003; Robotham, 2003; Francis, et al., ; Boxill, Lewis, Russell, et al., 2007). In 2007, a group of academic researchers conducted a cross-national and cross-border probability sample survey in the Caribbean and Latin American and found that 10.1 percentages of Jamaicans have been victims of crime compared to 16.9 percentages in Haiti; 19.2 percentages in Honduras, and 26.2 percentages in Peru (Boxill, Lewis, Russell, et al., 2007), and opined that “The crime rates vary in structure and complexity across different countries of the region [Caribbean and Latin America]” (p. 113).

The current crime problem in the Caribbean, particularly Jamaica, can be traced to the early nineteenth century in Kingston. The early settlers in Kingston were primarily poor and free slaves, and while the establishment of dwellings therein were in response to the economics at the time, criminal activities were committed only by a small percentage of the populace (Simmonds 2004). The pull factors to criminal activities were economic hardship, perceived betterment from the alternative investment schemes and the low probability of being incarcerated (Becker, 1968). The economic marginalization of the peasants, income maldistribution, social exclusions and economic progress of the bourgeoisie (planters) class during slavery provide a justification for social deviances (Besson, 1995; Gordon, 1987; Stone, 1987, 1988; Beckford, 1972). Criminality being an economic phenomenon (Becker, 1968; Francis, et al, 2001) provides a justification for criminal networks operating from different geographic localities in order to carry out their activities, a dynamic structure of organised criminality (see Harriott, 2008).

Statistics revealed that the 1980s mark a transition in wanton murders in Jamaica (see

Table 1 in Appendix), although its genesis began in the 1970s. Obaka Gray opined that 1) “...unforgiving ghetto during the party civil wars in the 1970s” (Gray, 2003), 2) “This study focuses on the period of the 1970s, a time of great upheaval, political violence, and social polarization in Jamaica” (Gray, 2003, 3), 3) “Activists during the 1970s reported that Barth [a notorious criminal] was familiar with former CIA agent Philip Agee’s critique of U.S. imperialism...” (Gray, 2003, 28), and 4) Indeed, by the late 1970s urban gangster for both the political and criminal underworlds were becoming a growing source of patronage with which politicians had to compete” (Gray, 2003, 30). Those issues highlighted the emergence of intense criminality, the informal industry which existed because of the failure of the formal economy to adequately provide for the needs of the people and the populace was now tired of the vulnerability, wanton killing of people, including the wealth and self-interest lead to a new consciousness. Hence, criminality in the Caribbean has now become cross-border activities as criminals seek to protect, strengthened, expand, and legitimize their operations. There is empirical evidence to support the transnational operation of gangs in the region, for example, the Shower Posse (Blake, 2002) and how these criminal gangs extort, rape, murder, increase fear and victimization, trade in guns and drugs, launder money, commit financial crimes, and corrupt public officials (Waller, Bourne, Minto and Rapley, 2007) in order to materialize their operations.

The seriousness of the crime problem in the Caribbean, particularly Jamaica, means that peoples’ fear of crime and victimization had reached an alarming level that they were now willing to circumvent the time that the police would take to solve the cases and the justice system pronounce guilt on the criminals. This was reported by Harriott (2003), when he said that “There, in response to a series of incidents of violent crime, citizens mobilized themselves as

vigilante groups and rioted and attacked a police station in an effort to “lynch” three men whom they erroneously thought were criminals and who had sought refuge in the police station” (Harriott, 2003, 3). Outside of those violent crimes, transnational crimes are now creating serious problems for the Caribbean and Latin America region.

There is extensive empirical evidence that the Caribbean is experiencing a period of terrorism that emerged from narcotic trans-shipment and gun smuggling and that this does not serve the interest of politicians (Griffith, 2004a, 2004b). As the gang members (or underground traders) are not serving the interest of politicians as was the case in the 1940s, 1970s and beyond, there are indications that macroeconomic climate as well as the micro-climate is causing the gradual rise in crime. Within the context of Robotham’s perspective that “Probably the most intractable factor contributing to violent crime in Jamaica is the interconnecting network of criminal gangs, drug running, politics, and the police” (Robotham, 2003, 215). The networking of criminal gangs and their operations extend beyond the Caribbean to the United States, Canada and other developed nations (Williams, 1998; Wagley, 2006; Sullivan,; Shelley, 2005; Rollie, 2005; Quinones and Serran, 2008; Mueller, 1998; Inni, 1971, 1974; Cressy, 1997; Cook, 2007; Bruner, 2005; Black, 2000). The aim of this study is to examine functional and workable regional security strategies to counter transnational crimes, with specific reference to the Caribbean.

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Gangs like the Shower Posse in Jamaica (Blake, 2002), extend their reach to other nations. Such gangs are labelled transnational gangs because of their functionality in different geo-political regions. Unlike transnational operations of old, which engaged in smuggling of contrabands and trafficking of human beings across state borders,

the contemporary ones are global agents (Ellington, 2009). According to Ellington (2009).

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) have taken advantage of weakening government institutions in some countries, especially following the break up of the former Soviet Union; more open borders and the re-surgence of ethnic and regional conflicts in many regions of the world. Crime networks have also exploited expanding trade and financial markets, while benefiting from rapidly advancing technology, broadened international travel and improved global communication (p. 2)

Ellington’s perspective highlights the interconnectivity of national and international crimes, and how national criminal groups have forged international linkages with other criminalities and weaken local governance. The weakening of local governance by criminal organizations have been fostered by their economic power and to a lesser extent psychological pressure.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2006) contended that while it is difficult to accurately stipulate a monetary value on the operations of transnational crimes, conservatively it is about two to five percentages of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The volume of money that the criminals have access to accounts for the option that is available to them to weaken already weak public institutions (Wagley, 2006). Wagley (2006) noted that transnational crime most frequently originates in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Former Soviet Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, but its effects are global. In fact, some criminologists and other experts have contended that there is a nexus between organized crime and terrorism (Harriott, 2003; 2004; Robotham, 2003; Gray, 2003), and that organized crimes account for some of the murders and violent crimes in a society (Black, 2000; Bruner, 2005; Cressy, 1997; Quinones and Serrana, 2008).

The crime problem in the Caribbean as well as other nations, therefore, is knotted at the navel of politics, political patronage, political ideology, and political segregation (Robotham, 2003; Gray, 2003; Griffith, I.L., 2004a; Lacy, 1977; Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Clarke, 2006) as well as economics (Bourne, Blake, Sharpe-Pryce and Solan, 2012; Bourne, Solan, Sharpe-Pryce, Drysdale and Fearson, 2012; Bourne and Solan, 2012; Bourne, 2012; March and Bourne, 2011; Bourne, 2011; Ellis, 1991, 1992). The perspectives of United Nations and the World Bank go to the core of the crime pandemic; politics. Owing to economic marginalization of many peoples in the Caribbean, party politics and loyalty have been used to distribute scarce resources (United Nations and ECLAC, 2008; Gray, 2003a, 2003b; Sives, 2003; Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Robotham, 2003; Harriott, 2003a, 2003b, 2004); and this account for the rise in criminal networks which have international connections.

Empirical evidence exists which showed that transnational criminal networks like Shower Posse (Blake, 2002) wreaked havoc on Jamaican society as well as many other nations. Many transnational organised crime syndicates use their economic base to weaken governance structures, terrorise communities, increase psychological fear, murder rivals and enemies, launder money, corrupt public officials and weakens internal democracy. The United Nations and World Bank (2007) study entitled 'Crime, violence, and development: Trends, costs, and policy options in the Caribbean' noted that:

[t]he Governments of the Caribbean countries recognize the seriousness of the problem and are exploring innovative policy responses at both the national and regional levels. Civil society organizations are doing their part as well by designing and implementing violence prevention programs targeting youth violence, violence against women, and other important forms of violence (United Nations and World Bank, 2007, 8)

It is within the context of the United Nations and World Bank's perspective, the aforementioned literature and reality that criminal networks have wreaked havoc on the society as well as the statistics on major crimes, particularly murders, that warrants a critical investigation of transnational organized crime and strategies that can be employed in Caribbean governments to address the problem. Within the context that organized criminal activities transcends geo-political localities, retards sovereignty, and highly likely to reduce national and regional stability, there is clearly a need to put transnational organized crime into context in the region (Caribbean) and how it is possible to implement strategies to lower and/or reduce its scope on a society.

VALUE OF THE STUDY

There is no denial that transnational criminal networks pose significant threat to national and international borders in the form of 1) viability of nations, 2) governance of the society, 3) violent crimes, 4) terrorism, 5) drug smuggling into human trafficking, 6) smuggling of body parts, 7) illegal trading of weapons, motor vehicles, contract killings, kidnappings, robberies, home, 8) community invasions, and 9) other lucrative social destabilization activities. In fact, it was stated that in the 1980s, the Shower Posse was responsible for some 1,400 murders, co-opting political officials, offered economic contracts, illegal trading of weapons, motor vehicles, contract killings, kidnappings, robberies, home and community invasions, money laundering, lucrative social destabilization activities as well as illegal migration and narcotics trafficking (Blake, 2002), which is similar the case for other gangs in places like Mexico, Russia, and nations in Latin and Central America (Logan 2006; Finkenheuer and Waring 1998; Beittel, 2011; Manwaring, 2007; Gomez, 2008; Logan, 2011; Grayson, and Logan, 2012; Schiller, 2011; Ramsey, 2012).

The issue of money laundering extends beyond the geo-political borders of Jamaica which began long before the legislation that was enacted in 2007 on the Proceeds of Crime Act (BOJ, 2009). According to Chong and Lopez-De-Silanes (2007, 4), money laundering has been on the minds of policy makers for centuries. The rationales for the importance of examining money laundering are due to the use of this activity to support criminal activities, sabotage of national infrastructure, corrupting public officials, and the issue of threats. Arnone and Borlini (2010) contended that “Money laundering (ML) and its transnational dynamics allow us to show how an accurate international apparatus has been evolving in the last 20 years to regulate conduct” (p. 227), suggesting that the phenomenon dates back for some time and has been modifying with time. This perspective is reiterated by McGrath (2007) who noted that the phenomenon goes back to the time of taxes and crime. She opined that the matter of money laundering “... has attracted the attention of world governments within the last century and became a criminal offence in Jamaica within the last quarter century” (McGrath, 2007, 8). Like in Jamaica, the matter became increasingly prominent again since 2001 in the United States and accounts for the rationale why it has led the charge on creating money laundering control regime (Reuter and Truman, 2005).

Within the context that transnational organized crime transcends national boundaries and threatens national and regional stability, this paper will offer significant insights to the matter, as the work will provide measures that can be used to effectively address the phenomenon. The current study will expand on the literature as it offers more than that which were previously presented in other studies. It will also set a premise for further study in the area of transnational organized crime by setting a platform that can be used to interpret the phenomenon. As such, research objectives of the

current study are: 1) To evaluate transnational organized crimes in the Caribbean with some reference to other jurisdictions, and 2) To determine strategies that can be used to lower, curtail, and likely address transnational organized crime in the Caribbean regions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

One of the responsibilities of any government is the provision of security for its populace. The issue of security includes internal and external security, and how governments must not only protect their borders but also ensure that institutional frameworks are implemented, instituted, and framed in order to secure its sovereign state. It should be noted here that national sovereignty does not mean unilateral decisions and strategies as some issues interface with many other geo-political spaces. In order to meet its own security, sovereign states must collaborate with other nations to address the transnational organized crimes, which have increased with globalization (Caricom IMPACS, 2006).

The operations of many organized criminal networks are in-and-outside their geo-political localities (Blake, 2002; Schiller, 2011; Williams, 1998). Within the context of power, profitability, and sales, organized criminal gangs have expanded their operation to offshore sites. The organized criminal gangs in Latin and Central America as well as the Caribbean operated from their local area and supply drug demand in the United States, Britain, and other developed nations (Blake, 2002; Beittel, 2011; Hansion, 2002). In so doing, there are the drug-for-gun trade; money laundering; violent crimes including murders, corrupting of public officials including politicians, exploitation of economically marginalized groups within a state; exploitation of states in which law enforcement institutions are weak in an effort to carry out the business

operation of the organized gang (Caricom IMPACS, 2006; Ellington, 2009).

Organized criminal gangs are business operations, which seek to not only maximize profits, but to also seek the operations going into the unforeseeable future. This accounts for the organized criminal agents directly or indirectly expanding operations to more than one country (Mueller, 1998). Hence, those organized gangs within the context of their multinational cooperation explain transnational organized crimes, and account for their efforts to corrupt public as well as private officials in many nations, particularly those countries with weak law enforcement institutions. By seeking to corrupt and corrupting public and private officials in different societies, transnational organized gangs threaten the stability and security of a sovereign state. This is not limited to developing weak states because the mafia also carried out their operations (money laundering, drug trafficking) in Italy, the United States, and other developed nations.

Money laundering affects the economy, impeding the social, economic, political, and cultural development of societies worldwide. Criminal activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, firearm trafficking, prostitution, and extortion have generated enormous profits that increase demand for money laundering. Fighting money laundering involves combating the recycling of illegally gained proceeds and providing additional tools to detect and go after the underlying crime (Beaumier and Hatfield, 2003). On examination of the issues on money laundering it is undeniable and easy for the matter to be referred to as 'dirty money'. One legal luminary notes that "The proceeds of crime help criminals to proceed with crime. This is part of the thinking that informs the anti-money laundering provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act" (Alleyne, 2012, 16B). Money laundering is, therefore, associated with criminal means and

one author opines that the U.S ascribes this to the Mafia (Schneider, 2008, 3).

The money laundering process starts at the placement stage. At this stage, cash derived directly from a crime is placed into the Financial Institution using various techniques, smurfing, structuring, camouflage, currency smuggling, buying travelers cheques, and so on (Schneider, 2008; McGrath, 2007; Chong and Lopez-De-Silanes, 2007; Arnone and Borlini, 2010; Beckarry, 2011; Royal Bank of the Canada, 2010, 2011). In the layering stage, the launderers try to conceal or disguise the source of the funds by making the money circulate through complex transactions in order to distance the funds from their source. The FATF highlights the following techniques used by money launderers in their quest to hide the source of funds: correspondent banking, bank cheques, collective accounts, payable through accounts, loans at low or no interest, back-to-back loans, fake invoices, fake insurances, fictitious sales and purchases, using shell companies, abusing trust companies or special purposes entities.

According to Simmonds (2004), the marginalization of poor peasants and lowerly freed slaves gave rise to the formation of Kingston (impoverished place in a state). She postulated aforementioned individuals in response to the difficult socio-economic situation began settling in Kingston. Nineteenth century Kingston spelt impoverishment, unemployment, squallors, hustling, socio-economic deprivation and marginalization, and suffering. Simmonds summarized the travails of urban Kingston living as:

At best it can be concluded that the pressures and stresses of living in an urban slave society were occasionally turned inwards, and were not aimed only at whites in the form of actions which may be defined strictly as slave resistance (Simmonds, 2004, 10).

It was documented that whenever the slaves protest against the harsh economic conditions or demonstrated against the propertied class (plantation class), they would be taken to court as this was considered to be an urban crime (Simmonds, 2004, 18). She noted that among the criminal offences that were brought against slaves were 1) burglaries, 2) assaults, 3) morranages, and 4) illegal possession of goods. It was recorded that theft or burglary was the most frequent offences brought against slaves in Kingston. Wanting to survive, without the socio-economic base to do so, slaves would plan the murder of their owners (Simmonds, 2004, 21). While it was not construed at the time to be gang that were formed by the slaves to murder their owners, the practice of planning such activities among themselves was a part of urban Kingston living. Instead of addressing the socio-economic inequalities and marginalization of urban Kingston slaves, harsher punishments were instituted as a means of socializing the slaves into submission and acceptance of their realities.

Western Kingston was fashioned by poor marginalized slaves. Out of the general society, Western Kingston marks squalor, unemployment, deprivation and socio-political inequalities. Slaves and free men from Western Kingston, in attempting to survive and meet the challenge economic realities, would become engaged in criminal activities. The population of Western Kingston grew larger and so did the economic challenges. The people lived outside of the care of the planters class, and defiance was a hallmark of urban poor (Gray, 2003). Instead of Sir Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley instituting measures that would alleviate the impoverishment, squalor, and degradation in Western Kingston, gangs were formed with people from Western Kingston and St. Andrew (Sives, 2003). She postulated that "The evidence highlights the existence of loyal supporters ready to engage in violence against their rivals during

this early phase of party politics in Kingston" (p. 50).

People from Western Kingston were used as political enforcers by the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) (Sives, 2003). The gang from Western Kingston was to carry out political assignments during the 1940s-1960s election campaigning and the People's National Party (PNP) responses to this thuggery by forming its own gang from 69 Matthews Lane (also from Kingston; Sives, 2003). Western Kingston gangs grew from one (which was located in Back-O-Wall- now Tivoli Gardens, belonging to the JLP) to two to include one from Matthews Lanes which was on the opposite side of the political spectrum, belonging to the PNP.

The 1970's saw a profilation of gangs (or thuggery in Jamaica) as this had extended to St. Andrew (Gray, 2003). The first political gang was formed by the JLP to carry out 'strong arm' politics, and the people were from Tivoli Gardens, Western Kingston, Jamaica. The gang grew over the decades and during the 1980s, the gang had a leader, Claude Massop, who was responsible for executing the will of his party against opposing people of the PNP. Clearly there was a nexus of crime and politics in Jamaica (Harriott, 2008), and this accounts for the rise of organized gang in Tivoli Gardens. Initially, the political system had to give the gangs and its members' authority and power in carrying out its mandate. The gang leader during the early 1980s began instituting measures and becoming engaged into activities outside of politics to include guns and drugs, notably marijuana (Blake, 2002).

The gang developed with the years, as new members are added, some left for the United States, and hustling was the primary way of survival for many of its members (Blake, 2002). Vivian Blake who was a bright young man, a resident of Tivoli Garden, migrated to the United States in the 1970s. He began hustling (trading in marijuana) and becoming involved with guns

(Blake, 2002). Vivian Blake then team with Lesler 'Jim Brown' Lloyd Coke to form the Shower Posse, and this time they were using political coverage while branching out into 1) money laundering, 2) drug and guns, and 3) widespread criminalities. Jim Brown was the Tivoli Gardens, Jamaica, arm of the Shower Posse and Vivian was its anchor in the United States (Blake, 2002). This Tivoli Gardens gang had become international, notorious, and dangerous. The gang had members in St. Kitts (Blake, 2002, 385), and became involved in organized transnational crime.

The members of the gangs had not only become transnational criminals, they began taking fewer orders from the political directorates in the JLP. In Jamaica, The death of Jim Brown and the incarceration of Vivian Blake in the United States (Blake, 2002), meant a change in the leadership structure of the gang and not its dismantlement. The gang had evolved from being a political watchdog to a powerful social structure which took less orders from the political system.

Criminality commences in different ways in particular geo-political jurisdictions. In Mexico, the 1990s saw Osiel Cardenas Guillen, the leader of the Gulf (DTO), desirous of killing a rival DTO. The intention of Guillen was to control and recruit a special group of the Mexican Army Special Forces selected from the Grupo Aeromovil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFES) soldiers. This special unit was a group of bodyguards. It arose as a result of Guillen's bodyguard murdering his daughter's godfather, and a special group of men with various training in security practices including military training to be bodyguard for the head of the cartel, Guillen.

Beittel (2011), postulated that the drug trafficking business has operated for more than a century, which has a longstanding history of functionality. However, in the last decades, it has expanded its operations to include human trafficking, other criminalities and these have seen an exponential

rise in various crimes, including murders. A part of the criminality involves the killing of individuals who the member deemed as prospective gang members, agents and rivals (Gomez, 2008; Logan, 2011; Grayson, and Logan, 2012; Schiller, 2011; Ramsey, 2012). There is ample evidence that linkages exist between the Los Zetas and other gangs in Central America (UNODC, 2012).

While the Tivoli Gardens gang, Western Kingston, Jamaica can be traced back to pre-emancipation (Simmonds, 2003), gangs in Mexico date back century (Beittel, 2011). The Tivoli Gardens gang has its beginning out of the socio-economic deprivation of the Jamaican society during the Nineteenth century. The earliest gang in Jamaica (Tivoli Gardens) was framed and fashioned by the political directorates (Sives, 2003) in order to attain power. Even though politics did not commence gang violence in Jamaica (Sives, 2003) it fuelled political garrisons, political and ideological divides, and violence. The Tivoli Gardens gang mushroomed from political donmanship (or badness honour – Gray, 2003) to a transnational organized entity which could not have been controlled by a single political personality. The gang outgrew its initial purpose of political enforcement and patronage to include drug and gun trafficking, money laundering, murder and victimization as well as the fear of victimization.

The Los Zetas gang in Mexico began out of a need to be a drug kingpin, unlike the one in Jamaica. Like the one in Jamaica, it grew to become a transnational drug, gun, and other criminal activities network. Both Los Zetas and Tivoli Gardens gang had a structure of leadership, responsibilities and purpose in the structure. They were also based on loyalty to the leader, the willingness to execute the commands of the structure, large members, violence, reprisals, and murders. Like Tivoli Gardens gang, Los Zetas was feared by many people inside and outside their jurisdictions. Politicians feared the leadership, the leadership had powers that extend beyond his

country, and there were years of planning to topple these gangs.

Although neither Los Zetas nor Tivoli Gardens gangs (Beittel, 2011; Blake, 2002) had a membership fee like that of Premerio Comando da Capital of Brazil (Hansion, 2002), they had the following similarities: 1) large gang members, 2) involved in drug and gun trade, 3) engaged in other criminal activities, 4) clear leadership structure and command, 5) began small, 6) loyalty was important, 7) transnational, 8) organized, 9) the population suffered from fatigue and fear, and 10) had an exorbitant powers base. Like Harriott (2008) opined, organized gangs had networking and engaged in other crimes. Becker's work offers some explanation for the involvement of people in gangs in Tivoli and Los Zetas as economics was a pulling factor as well as the price of punishment. Members of both gangs did not fear being caught, they had a good economic base, lived lavishly, and was able to use their networking to avoid being caught and imprisoned by the state.

METHODOLOGY

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Max Weber (1949, 1974, 1981) was the first to argue that an 'Interpretivism' approach can be employed in the examination of social phenomenon. Weber opined that why human behave the way they do is lost in quantitative methodologies (or positivism). He therefore, forwarded the use of subjectivity (feels, beliefs or meanings) in social inquiry, which began the use of interpretivism in the social sciences (Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979). For years, the inquiry of social phenomenon was based on objectivity until Weber introduced an alternative paradigm. This

..

gave rise later to the emergence of (i) ethnography, (ii) phenomenology, (iii) case study, (iv) grounded theory, (v) feminism, (vi) biography, (vii) historical comparative analysis, and other methodologies (discourse analysis, heuristic inquiry, action research and context analysis), in keeping with an alternative paradigm in scientific examination as approaches in understanding human behaviours.

One such subjective methodologies, which is long established in the literature is phenomenology (Flick, 2006; Silverman, 2005). Phenomenology is one of the methodologies in qualitative research that evolved as an alternative paradigm to objectivism. It focuses on constructing meanings instead of discovering meanings. Crotty (2005) ably provided a classic argumentative of the meaning of constructions in understanding human realities. He contended that "From the constructionist viewpoint, therefore, meaning (or truth) cannot be described simply as 'objective'. By the same token, it cannot be described simply as 'subjective'. Some researchers describing themselves as constructionist talk as if meaning are created out of whole cloth and simply imposed upon reality" (Crotty, 2005, 43). This suggests that understanding people's behaviour can be interpreted from a perspective of meaning constructions and not just from an objectivistic approach – which emphasises precision, measurement, falsification, and measurement. In keeping with the constructionist perspective on reality that it is a construction of meanings; then, this work in seeking to understand the phenomenon of transnational organized gangs (or networks) and strategies to address them in the Caribbean region employed social Constructivism as the matter requires some construction of meaning in order to grasp the complexity in this area.

Constructivism




Figure 1. Four elements of Constructivism

DOCUMENT REVIEWS

The researchers reviewed written documents including books, journal articles, and scholarly articles online. The review was to determine 1) theoretical framework, 2) employed strategies, 3) epistemological framework for the study, and 4) how to interpret the information. A major reason for the document review is to assist in triangulating and validating information obtained from different secondary sources.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

POLICY

The outcomes of actions or non-action after the implementation stage

Threat level is “The degree of danger that exists at any given time as determined by analysis of available information and intelligence” (US Department of State, 1990, 4), which is used in this work.

“Violent crime (number of violent crime) constitutes nine offences as labelled by the Jamaican Constabulary Force (murder, shooting, rape and carnal abuse, robbery, manslaughter, infanticide, suicide, felonious wounding, and other offences against the person)” as said by Bourne, Pinnock and Blake. (2012, 7), which is used for this work.

According to Bourne, Powell and Blake (2012) “**murder** denotes the number of people unlawfully killed (a crime causing death without a lawful excuse) within a particular geopolitical

zone (excluding police killings or homicides)...”, which provides the interpretation for murders in this study.

Mueller (1998) defines transnational crime as “*offences whose inception, prevention and/ or direct or indirect efforts involve more than one country*”. According to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, “*organized crime consists of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert, with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes, or offences, in order to obtain directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.*”

TERRORISM

The definition of the word terrorism is moot. Governments, organizations and other entities, define terrorism within their own circumstances. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense defines terrorism as “*the unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives*”. The US Department of Defense defines Terrorism as “*All criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public*”. It also defines it as “*the calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.*”

EXTORTION

It obtaining something by illegal threats: the crime of obtaining something such as money or information from somebody by using force, threats, or other unacceptable methods.

DRUG TRAFFICKING

It is a worldwide black market consisting of production, distribution, packaging, and sale of illegal psychoactive substances.

MONEY LAUNDERING

It is the process by which the appearance of money obtained from illicit sources is disguised in such a way that it gives legitimacy to the origin of that source: (*Laws of Jamaica*).

DISCUSSION

Clearly, transnational organized gangs have their tentacles in many societies, are engaged in various criminal activities and employ measures to keep their operation going into the unforeseeable future. In so doing, they corrupt public and private officials, launder money, involved in violent crimes, weaken democracy and prey on states with weak law enforcement institutions. In this section of the paper, the researchers critically discuss a multi-faceted approach which is cross-national to address transnational organized crimes in the Caribbean.

In Jamaica, the National Strategy to address Transnational Threats are directed at the threats posed by: 1) The illicit production and trade of narcotics, 2) The trafficking organisations themselves, 3) The trafficking and trade in illegal firearms and ammunition, 4) The laundering and the attendant corruptive influence of the illicit earnings of the drug trade, 5) The growing trends of drug abuse within the Jamaican society, fuelling the need to implement effective drug demand reduction and treatment programmes, and 6) The corruptive nature of the proceeds of

drug and the limitation in state resources to counter the threat, highlighting the need to embark on a process of institutional strengthening. Many of the aforementioned strategies are equally the same across the Caribbean, because of the transnational nature of organized nations, the interconnectivity, and the consensus among international governments that strategies are needed to counter transnational organized crimes.

According to Arnone and Borlini (2010), current anti-money laundering (AML) strategy is necessary and has become widely accepted within the international community chiefly because of the negative effects of money laundering. They further posited that as a result of the foregoing, money laundering counter measures have been afforded a central position in both national and global programs, political declarations, and international treaties. With the increase of terrorist financing, the normative activity at the international level has further risen (see also, Schneider, 2008).

Arnone and Borlini highlighted Sham's reconstruction of the four main phases: during the 1970s it was in its developing stage. The focus over this decade was more regulatory and preventative in nature (record keeping and suspicious transaction reporting by banks).

The second stage, commenced in the 1980s, which produced criminalization and internationalization. In 1989, the AML regime entered a third phase (supra-nationalization) with the establishment of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989, whose purpose was to develop and coordinate the efforts to counter money laundering by identifying the trail of money flows in order to seize and confiscate ill-gotten gains systematically. Following September 11, 2001, a new phase emerged when the FATF mandate was extended to also cover terrorism financing.

Initially, money laundering was confined to the Mafia laundering illegal monies by way of cash-intensive washing salons in the 1930s (Schneider, 2008). The paradigm shift to include proceeds and operations from terrorism emerged owing to the terrorist attack on the United States in 9/11 (Ensminger, 2002). The proceeds from crime must extend to 1) internet payment system – lottery scams, and 2) commercial websites (BoJ, 2009), which provides the impetus for the inclusion of the non-banking sector in the Proceeds of Crime Act in Jamaica as the money launderers were utilizing many media to make ‘Dirty Money’, Clean. Arnone and Borlini (2010) contend that globalization has opened a plethora of avenues with which money laundering is possible because of new opportunities and transnational economic crimes. This has led nations like the United States to institute Anti-Money Laundering (AML) legislation (USA PATRIOT ACT) to combat the operations of money launderers (Beaumier and Hatfield, 2003; Raghaven, 2006) as well as other geo-political localities such as Austria (Schneider, 2008); Jamaica (BoJ, 2009; RBC, 2010, 2011; McGrath, 2008; Alleyne, 2012)- and Chong and Lopez-De-Silanes (2007) declares it is in 80 nations.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 1998) committee developed 40 recommendations on Money Laundering and 9 special recommendations on combating the Financing of Terrorism, which set out the measures governments should take to implement an effective anti-money laundering, counter financing of terrorism program which have become the international standard (BoJ, 2009; McGrath, 2008; FATF, 1998). The recommendations call for the criminalization of money laundering and propose that criminal liability for money laundering be extended to individuals as well as corporations who are in the position to facilitate the money laundering process. Acknowledging financial institutions as gatekeepers, it directs governments to enact

legislations that will impose restrictions and obligations on these financial institutions as it relates to protecting the institution from criminal elements as well as assisting the authorities in obtaining information that may result in the capture of criminals and the forfeiture of assets obtained illegally. In the US, the PATRIOT Act and other legislations have outlined the framework to protect financial institutions from being infiltrated by money launderers (Beaumier and Hatfield, 2003; Beaumier, 2008), which is similar to the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) in Jamaica (BoJ, 2009).

The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) was formed as a regional body, which developed model regulations, geared towards preventing the abuse of the financial system by criminals and protecting the integrity of the financial sector and to demonstrate cooperation with the FATF’s 40 recommendations in the region (McGrath, 2008). The CFATF formulated 19 recommendations with the main objective being to prevent and control money laundering within the Caribbean region. These recommendations include: 1) The licensing of all banks, including offices, branches and agencies of foreign banks, whether deposit taking or not, conducting business in the country; 2) The periodic examinations of financial institutions by authorities to ensure that their anti-money laundering programs are adequate and that they have implemented the other recommendations of the FATF, and 3) The application of criminal sanctions to financial institutions that fail to retain records for the specified period and/or fail to, or falsely file reports, or structure transactions with the intent to evade the reporting requirements.

Out of these 49+19 recommendations, Jamaica developed several Acts, Regulations and Guidance on how financial institutions must operate in order to be compliant and prevent criminals from accessing the financial sector (Sykes, 2007; BoJ, 2009). The current Acts,

Regulations and Guidance are being used by the financial institutions in Jamaica. It is widely believed that the proceeds of crime, aid criminals in their operation (Schneider, 2008). It is this thinking that informs the anti-money laundering provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act and/or the US PATRIOT Act. These provisions create specific money laundering offences, outline applicable penalties, and impose obligations on businesses in regulated sectors to take active steps to prevent and detect money laundering. A failure to observe these statutory anti-money laundering obligations could turn the unwitting business into a silent partner in crime and an offender under the Act (BoJ, 2007 - POCA). It is therefore essential to have an understanding of the content and scope of these obligations. The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), formerly the Royal Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (RBTT), has published a document entitled "Global AML compliance management framework (RBC, 2011) which outlines a clear guideline on the phenomenon, compliance and regulations that should be followed in keeping with the overarching framework of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism in the world.

One of the most important anti-money laundering obligations under the Act in Jamaica (POCA Money Laundering Prevention (MLP) Act, 2007 by the Bank of Jamaica (BoJ, 2009)) is the duty of businesses in the regulated sector to report suspicious transactions to a nominated officer or to a designated authority, which are equally outlined in Royal Bank of Canada compliance management framework on AML (RBC, 2011). A suspicious transaction is essentially one which could constitute or related to money laundering. In this regard, an offence is committed if a person knows or believes, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or believing that another person has engaged in a suspicious transaction; the information came to that person in the course of a business in the regulated sector

and the person does not disclose the information to a nominated officer or designated authority (POCA 2007 – in BoJ, 2007).

The AML strategies do not only extract the economic base of transnational organized gangs (or networks), but also retards their operation and pending activities. By removing the economic base of criminal entities, this handicaps their operations and stifles its growth. Studies have found that the larger Alternative Investment Schemes (AISs) tend to use the banking system as a means of disguising their assets and are a part of the wider money laundering industry. The case in point is, in Jamaica, the two largest schemes (based on CaPRI's 2008 study were Cash Plus and Olint), used the largest Bank in the country, the National Commercial Bank (Henry, 2008; Henry and Davis, 2008) and evidence supports they were actively engaged in money laundering schemes. Valentine (1998) postulated that the Internet is an essential tool via websites that are used to entice unsuspecting investors worldwide. These schemes usually hide away millions of dollars of investor's funds in offshore bank accounts in countries such as Antigua and the Cayman Islands. Valentine (1998) continues that the law enforcement is an effective means of protecting investors and the financial sector from falling prey to these schemes. The regulatory authorities must seek to close the new avenues created by criminal network to launder money, sustain their operation, and exploit weak law enforcement institutions and capacities as well as marginalized groups within a society.

The empirical evidence which supports the economics of crime (Becker, 1968; Bourne, Pinnock, and Blake, 2012; Bourne, 2011) cannot be overly emphasized in security or crime management. When Manunta (1998) forwarded that socio-economic and political factors are critical to security, it is absolutely supported by the studies in Jamaica that have revealed the importance of economics to changes in violent crimes (i.e., murders (Bourne, et al., 2012;

Bourne, 2011). People are not drawn to crimes simply because they are 1) innately wicked, 2) sinful, 3) corrupt, 4) under-socialized, 5) psychologically different, 6) institutional weaknesses in the laws, and 7) marginalized. It is more in keeping with the economics of survivability, the economics of crimes and economics of punishment (Becker, 1968, Bourne, et al., 2012; Bourne, 2011). Manunta (1998) aptly encapsulated the crime and security matter that security is a function of asset, protector, threat and specific situation. Embedded in Manunta's perspective is the economics labelled as assets, and the issues that pull people into criminality.

Equally, Bourne (2011), and Bourne, Pinnock and Blake (2012) empirically established that the exchange rate is the most significant factor accounting for change in violent crimes (i.e., murders, which is supporting the economics of crimes forwarded by Becker (1968) as well as Francis et al. (2001). The general prescription of economics to interpret crimes can be similarly applied to the lottery scams. A qualitative study by Anderson (2011) revealed that even police officers have become corrupt, not because of poverty, but owing to the economics of crime (see also Anderson and Bourne, 2012).

Becker (1968), having established the correlation between involvement in crimes and economics, provides a premise upon which lottery scams can be interpreted. Among the factors identified by Becker were 1) income other than from crime or employment and 2) wage for an hour spent in criminal activity. It can be extrapolated from Becker's empirical theory that if the opportunity cost (alternative foregone) of the involvement of

crimes is lower than the cost of its engagement people will opt to participate than abstain in criminality. Clearly, such a theory anchors why people provide information to the scammers, money laundering, other criminalities, despite the probability of likelihood of being caught.

The aforementioned activities provide a justification for the strategies that directly address money laundering and scamming; but also one that is multi-level that address those issues as well as border issues, human trafficking, terrorism, corruption, and drug and guns trafficking because of the complexities and scope of transnational organized gangs. Figure 2 below presents a summary of the major trafficking routes, and thereby speaks to the importance of trans-border cooperation among nations in order to address transnational organized crime networks. Simply put, transnational organized criminal activities are not specialised to a single nation (or state). It therefore means that law enforcement to address transnational crimes must be multi-faceted including international laws and conventions.

The very nature of transnational crime (including scope and activities) warrants 1) strengthening anti-crime legislation; 2) modernizing state bureaucracy; 3) corruption measures and legislations; 4) reform of the criminal justice system; 5) building law enforcement capabilities; 6) modernization of security measures including border security, and 7) multi-state cooperation . the quintessential question therefore is, What has the Caribbean done in the aforementioned regards?




Figure 2. Major trafficking routes (norcastic trafficking)

In respect to border security, a number of strategies have been instituted in the Caribbean region. These include 1) a regional stolen and lost travel database; 2) regional deportee database; 3) regional and UN watch list; 4) caricom passport, and 5) caricom travel cards. In addition to the previously mentioned strategies, there is 1) intelligence sharing International Criminal Police Organization ICPO or **INTERPOL**, 2) training and the provision of local forces law enforcement exchanges; and 3) mutual assistance treaties (extraditions). Initially, those measures and strategies were geared towards reducing the organized criminal network by making local crime, national and international crimes punishable in a global context. Such a reality strengthen the capabilities and capacities of local law enforcement; destroys and fragment criminal activities; make it increasingly difficult for traffickers to use local areas and facilities for illicit activities related to drug production and trafficking; and deny ports from trafficking in

illegal arms and ammunitions. Hence, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RECO law (terrorism or border security) aids in the fight against transnational border crimes.

It should not be forgotten that transnational organized network seeks to corrupt public and private officials in states, particularly those with weak law enforcement institutions, which means that strategies are needed to curb these practices. The 'Corruption Prevention Act', 'Anti-Corruption Act', 'State Mechanisms such as the Office of the Contractor General (OCG)' are in keeping with transnational organized crime 'fighting' mechanisms and/or strategies employed by regions. Corruption Prevention strategies, while they are important, are just a part of the multi-faceted approaches employed by the regions to address transnational organized crimes. These must include customs controls, financial mechanisms, and security controls.

Customs and the Jamaica Constabulary Force, which is equally the case across many Caribbean states, have been undergoing modernization and reform in keeping with international standards in an effort to address internal weaknesses that once existed in the system. The purpose of the modernization of those institutions are to 1) strengthen and improve the operations and infrastructure of existing law enforcement and

institutions, and 2) project the positive image of the nation as a country committed to the eradication of international drug trafficking, through the demonstration of tangible measures and results. To understand the importance and rationale for aforementioned measures are to critically examine how transnational arms trafficking can utilize customs, as a part of its transshipment mechanism (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Arms trafficking

Jamaica has instituted a ‘Drug Trafficking Court’ specifically to curb the transshipment of drugs into its borders. This new approach is a judicial one, which takes the discussion into the area of judicial modernization. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is currently being staffed, and trained in realities in the region in order to equip judges specifically in Caribbean matters so they can effectively hear cases from the region. The CCJ is not the only modernization of the judiciary system in the region as local courts have begun internal changes that are in line with the final appellate court (CCJ). In addition to the modernization of the regional and local courts,

there have been substantial changes in legislation in keeping with the globalized realities of crimes and criminal activities. One such legislation is the Proceeds of Crimes Act, which forfeits the proceeds of illicit activities from criminal networks. This allows for the forfeiture of assets from individuals such as Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke and Leebert Ramcharan and their deportation to the United States for judicial trial. Embedded in the previously mentioned named individuals are multi-faceted natures of the laws relating to 1) extradition (new), 2) forfeiture of asset, 3) cross-border criminal investigations, and 4)

strengthening of international cooperation in law enforcement.

CONCLUSION

According to Harriott (2004, 242), "The communities of the marginalized urban inner-city poor are mostly affected by this murderous violence". This suggests that further deterioration in the general economy of any nation without a corresponding social safety network that can adequately maintain human survivability, decency, and belief in the formal structure, money laundering among other crimes will rise. Within the context of the economics of crime, without addressing the economic vulnerability of people within nations, it will be increasingly difficult to solve criminal operations in the long-term.

The new measures instituted and that will be formulated to address some of the challenges identified in this research will be shifted in the future if the general economic vulnerability within the state is not addressed. What is likely to result is a shift possibly from money laundering, human, drug and arms trafficking as well as lottery scamming to something else. The present paper highlights the nature of transnational organized crime, and strategies employed to curb organized crimes in the Caribbean and Latin America.

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) in itself cannot be dealt with by any one country and must be addressed through collective and cohesive effort. All stakeholders must play a significant role to pool resources to stem and make a major impact on this enterprise that seeks to constantly disrupt the entrenched values and governing rules and regulations of the region as well as on a global basis. Whilst we recognize that it is a surmountable task based on the level of corruption in the society (Waller, Bourne, Minto and Rapley, 2007) and penetration of Public Officials (Powell, Bourne and Waller, 2007)

that have already taken place, it is by no means an easy one. The re-socialization of our society and mentorship of our young people can significantly add to the strategy to achieve this remarkable milestone of severe indentation and stamping out of Transnational Organized Crime.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations have been made based on the empirical nature of the findings of this study:

1. Increase social assistance;
2. Reduce socio-political marginalization of people in the society;
3. Strengthen border security measures;
4. Have a zero tolerance to minor offences (including anti-litter laws);
5. Lower income inequalities and disparities among the social groups in the society;
6. Have a functional cooperation among Caricom members;
7. Research the expectations and desires of citizens in the region in order to design programmes that will meet those issues within the context of crime eradication and reduction;
8. Establish inter-operability among regional security forces and the United States in joint anti-narcotics, arms trafficking operations etc.;
9. Seek stringent restrictions on United States of America Gun Control Law relating to purchase and import of arms and ammunitions in coastal states like Florida;
10. Rigid constraints on shippers and freight forwarders importing/exporting goods and imposing heavy fines on them if contraband is detected;
11. Network all computerized systems for ports within the region (difficult but attainable);
12. Establish a Caricom regional intelligence bureau, security and cross border investigation unit

REFERENCES

- [1]. Alleyne, M. (2012, January 4). Dirty money. Clean. Kingston: The Jamaica Observer.
- [2]. Anderson, R. (2011). A comparative analysis of the Protective Services Division in the Jamaica Constabulary Force: Past, present and the way forward. Unpublished Master Thesis, University of the West Indies, Mona.
- [3]. Anderson, R., and Bourne PA. (2012). The road travelled by the Protective Services Division in the Jamaica Constabulary Force: Politics, culture, socialization and division. *Asian Journal of Business Management* 4(3): 209-232
- [4]. Bank of Jamaica (BoJ). (2009). 2004 (Revised 2009) guidance notes on the detection and prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing activities. Kingston: BoJ.
- [5]. Beaumier, C.M., and Hatfield, C.J. (2003, February). Effective anti-money-laundering monitoring: Issues and challenges. *Bank accounting and finance*. 16(2):44-48.
- [6]. Becker, G.S. (1968). "Crime and punishment: An economic approach." *Journal of Political Economy* ;76:69-217.
- [7]. Beckford, G. (1972). *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World.* London: Oxford University Press.
- [8]. Beittel, J.S. (2011). Mexico's drug trafficking organizations: Source and scope of the rising violence. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Services.
- [9]. Besson, J. The legacy of George L. Beckford's plantation economy thesis in Jamaica. *New West Indian Guide/ Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* 1995; 69, no: 1/2, Leiden, 111-119.
- [10]. Black, Allan. (2000, May 7-17). *Organized Crime in New York 1930-1950.* www.americanmafia.com.
- [11]. Blake, D. (2002). *Shower Posse: The most notorious Jamaica criminal organization.* New York: Diamond Publishing.
- [12]. Bourne PA, and Solan I. (2012). Health, violent crimes, murder and inflation: public health phenomena. *J Behav Health*. 2012; 1(1): 59-65.
- [13]. Bourne PA, Solan I, Sharpe-Pryce C, Drysdale S, and Fearon M. (2012). Devaluation in the Exchange Rate and its influence on murder in a developing nation: A new public health focus arising from economics. *J Behav Health*, 1(4): 269-278.
- [14]. Bourne PA. (2012). Murder and ill-health: A health crime phenomenon. *J Behav Health*. 2012; 1(2):138-146.
- [15]. Bourne, P.A., D.K. Blake, C. Sharpe-Pryce and I. Solan. (2012). Murder and Politics in Jamaica: A Historical Quantitative Analysis, 1970-2009. *Asian J. Bus. Manage.*,4(3): 233-251.
- [16]. Bourne, PA, C. Pinnock and DK Blake, 2012. The Influence of Violent Crimes on Health in Jamaica: A Spurious Correlation and an Alternative Paradigm. *Journal of Clinical and Diagnostic Research* [serial online] 5-12.
- [17]. Bourne, PA. (2011). Re-Visiting the Crime-and-Poverty Paradigm: An Empirical Assessment with Alternative Perspectives. *Current Research Journal of Economic Theory* 3(4): 99-117.
- [18]. Bourne, PA., 2011. Re-Visiting the Crime-and-Poverty Paradigm: An Empirical Assessment with Alternative Perspectives. *Current Research Journal of Economic Theory* 3(4): 99-117.
- [19]. Bourne, PA., D.K. Blake, C. Sharpe-Pryce, & I. Solan. (2012). Murder and Politics in Jamaica: a historical quantitative analysis, 1970-2009. *Asian J of Business Management*.
- [20]. Boxill, I., Lewis, B., Russell, R., Bailey, A.,

- Waller, L., James, C., Martin, P. & Gibbs, L. (2007). Political culture and democracy in Jamaica: 2006. Kingston: The University of the West Indies and Vanderbilt University.
- [21]. Bruner, Tom. (2005, May). The maras and national security in central America: strategic insight. www.ccc.nps.mil/.si/2005/maybruner.
- [22]. Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CaPRI). (2008). Investigating Informal Investment Schemes in Jamaica. Kingston: CaPRI. Retrieved from <http://www.takingresponsibility.org> Accessed on June 28, 2012.
- [23]. Caricom Implementation Agency for crime and security (Impacs). (2006). Concept paper: Need for a regional crime and security strategy. Port of Spain: IMPACS
- [24]. Chong, A., and Lopez-De-Silanes, F. (2007). Money laundering and its regulation. Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, Working paper # 590.
- [25]. Clarke, C. (2006). Politics, violence and drugs in Kingston, Jamaica. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25: 420-440.
- [26]. Cook, Colleen, W. (2007, October 17). Analyst in Latin American, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division: Mexico's drug cartels, *CRS report for Congress*.
- [27]. Cressy Donald. (1997). Theft of the nation: the functions and structure of criminal syndicates. In P. Ryan & G. Rusheds *Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspectives* (pp.3-15, esp p.3). London: Sage.
- [28]. Crotty, M. (2005). The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in the research process. London: SAGE.
- [29]. Ellington, O. (2009). Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Implications for US National Security and Foreign Policy. Unpublished paper, University of Delaware.
- [30]. Ellis H. (1992). Identifying crime correlates in a developing society: A study of socio-economic and socio-demographic contributions to crime in Jamaica, 1950-84. New York: Peter Lang.
- [31]. Ellis, H. (1991). Report on Research into the Causes of Crime and Violence in Jamaica: a Study of Prison Inmates. Kingston: National Task Force on Crime and Violence.
- [32]. FATT (Financial Action Task Force). (1998). Website. Retrieved from <http://www.fatf.gafi.org>.
- [33]. Figueroa, M. & Sives, A. (2003). Garrison politics and criminality in Jamaica: Does the 1997 election present a turning point?" in *Understanding crime in Jamaica: New challenges for public policy* by A. Harriott, Ed., Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, pp. 63-88.
- [34]. Flick, U. (2006). "An introduction to qualitative research," 3rd ed. London: SAGE.
- [35]. Francis, A., Elvy, L., Kirton, C (2001). Crime in Jamaica: A preliminary analysis. Proceedings of the Second Caribbean Conference on Crime and Criminal Justice, 14-17th February, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica.
- [36]. Gomez, F. "Los Zetas por dentro," *El Universal*, December 31, 2008.
- [37]. Gordon, D. (1987). Class, status and social mobility in Jamaica. Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, Mona.
- [38]. Gray, O. (2003). Badness-honour. In *Understanding the crime in Jamaica: New challenges for public policy* by Anthony Harriott, 13-48. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press.
- [39]. Grayson, G.W. and Logan, S. (2012). *The Executioner's Men: Los Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, Criminal Entrepreneurs, and the Shadow State They Created*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- [40]. Griffith, I.L. (2004a). Caribbean security in the age of terror: Challenge and change. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
- [41]. Griffith, I.L. (2004b). Introduction: Understanding reality, interpreting change.

- In Caribbean security in the age of terror: Challenge and change by Ivelaw L. Griffith xxiii-xxxiii. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
- [42]. Harriott, A. (2003). Editor's overview. In *Understanding the crime in Jamaica: New challenges for public policy* by Anthony Harriott, ix-xx. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press.
- [43]. Harriott, A. (2004). Introduction. In: Harriott, A., Brathwaite, F. & Wortley, S., eds. (2004). *Crime and criminal justice in the Caribbean*. Kingston: Arawak Publication.
- [44]. Harriott, A. (2008). *Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica: Breaking the Nexus*. Kingston: Canoe Press, 2008.
- [45]. Henry, P. (Monday, April 21, 2008). NCB again blocked from closing Olin's account. Kingston: The Jamaica Observer; p. 12.
- [46]. Henry, P., and Davis, V. (Friday, April 12, 2008). Cash Plus boss, brother arrested. Kingston: Jamaica Observer; p. 3.
- [47]. Inni, Francis. (1971). Joseph Albini: *The American Mafia genesis of a legend*. New York: Appleton & Crosts.
- [48]. Inni, Francis. (1974). *Black Mafia ethnic succession in organized crime*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- [49]. Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). (1981). *The Jamaica Police Manual, vol I: Police administration duties and procedures*. Kingston: The Planning and Research Division, JCF.
- [50]. Jamaica Gleaner (2007, March 20). Williams, Ramcharan were extracted in haste – Phipps. Kingston: Gleaner.
- [51]. Lacy, T. (1977). *Violence and Politics in Jamaica: 1960-70*. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass.
- [52]. Logan, S. (2011). Preface: Los Zetas and a New Barbarism. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 22:5.
- [53]. Manunta, G. (1998). *Security: An introduction*. Bedfordshire: Cranfield University Press.
- [54]. Manwaring, M.G. (2007). A contemporary challenge to state sovereignty: Gangs and other illicit transnational criminal organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica and Brazil. Washington D.C: Department of the Army.
- [55]. March, C. and Bourne, P.A. (2011). The Influence of Macroeconomic Factors on Murders in Jamaica: Should the Police Be Cautious in Interpreting the Murder Statistics? *Asian Journal of Business Management*, 3(4): 257-277.
- [56]. McGrath, J.S. (2008). *Money laundering prevention: Financial institutions vs. Law Enforcement Agenda*. Master of Business Administration thesis. The University of Manchester.
- [57]. Mueller, Gerald. O. (1998, Autumn/Winter). *Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts: Transnational Organized Crime*, 4.
- [58]. Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ). (1969-2011). *Economic and social survey Jamaica, 1968-2010*. Kingston: PIOJ.
- [59]. Quinones, Sam & Serrana, Richard, A. (2008, November 16). Mexico drug wars spill across the border. *The Los Angeles Times*.
- [60]. Rabinow, P., and Sullivan, WM. (1979). "Introduction." In *Interpretive social science: A reader*. By Rabinow, Paul, and William M. Sullivan, 1-24. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- [61]. Raghaven, K.R. (2006, October-November). Integrating anti-money laundering into the compliance structure. *Bank accounting and finance*. 19(6):29-44.
- [62]. Ramsey, G. (2012). Have the Zetas Replaced the Sinaloa as Mexico's Most Powerful Cartel?" *Insight Crime*, January 3.
- [63]. Reuter, P., and Truman, E.M. (2005). Anti-money laundering overkill? It's time to ask how well the system is working. *The International Economy*. 19(1):56-60.

- [64]. Robotham, D. (2003). Crime and public policy in Jamaica. In Understanding the crime in Jamaica: New challenges for public policy by Anthony Harriott, 197-238. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press.
- [65]. Rollie, Lal (2005, May 24). Terrorism and organized crime join forces, *International Herald Tribune*.
- [66]. Royal Bank of the Caribbean (RBC). (2010, October). Global AML compliance management: Framework. Kingston: RBC
- [67]. Royal Bank of the Caribbean (RBC). (2011, August). Global AML compliance management framework. Kingston: RBC.
- [68]. Schiller, D. (2011). Zeta Soldiers Launched Mexico-Style Attack in Harris County. *Houston Chronicle*, November 23.
- [69]. Schneider, F. (2008). Money laundering and financial means of organized crime: Some preliminary empirical findings. "Paola Baffi" centre on central banking and financial regulation research paper series No. 2008-16. Retrieved on June 24, 2012 from <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136149>.
- [70]. Shelley, Louise. (2005, Winter/Spring). The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption and Terrorism, *Brown's Journal of World Affairs*.
- [71]. Silverman, D. (2005). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talks, Text and Interaction 2nd ed. SAGE Publication. London.
- [72]. Simmonds, L.E. (2004). The problem of crime in an urban slave society: Kingston in the early nineteenth century. In Crime and criminal justice in the Caribbean, by Anthony Harriott, 8-34. Kingston: Arawak Publishers.
- [73]. Stone, C. (1987). Crime and violence: Socio-political implication. In Phillips P, Wedderburn J eds. Crime and violence: Causes and solutions. Kingston: Department of Government, the University of the West Indies.
- [74]. Stone, C. (1988). Crime and violence: socio political implications. In Crime and Violence: Causes and Solutions edited by P. Phillips and J. Wedderburn. Mona, Jamaica: Department of Government.
- [75]. Sullivan, John, P. (2008). Transitional gangs: the impact of third generation gangs in South America.
- [76]. United Nations (UN) and World Bank. (2007). Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean, Report No. 37820. New York: UN and World Bank.
- [77]. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2012). Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean A Threat Assessment. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf, accessed on January 17, 2017.
- [78]. Wagley, John.R. (2006, March). Congressional research report transnational: organized crime principal threats and responses.
- [79]. Waller, L., Bourne, P.A., Minto, I. & Rapley, J. (2007). A landscape assessment of corruption in Jamaica. Kingston: Caribbean Policy Research Institute
- [80]. Weber, Max. (1949). The methodology of the social sciences, trans. Shils, E., and Finch, H., eds. New York: Free Press.
- [81]. Weber, Max. (1974). Subjectivity and determinism. In positivism and sociology by Giddens, A., 23-32. London: Heinemann.
- [82]. Weber, Max. (1981). Some categories of interpretative sociology. *Sociological Quarterly* 22:151-180.
- [83]. Williams, P. (1998, April). Transnational Criminal Networks. University of Pittsburgh.

APPENDIX

Table 1. Number of Murders and Violent Crime in Jamaica, 1970-2010

Year	Murder	Violent crime	Year	Murder	Violent crime
1970	152		1990	542	20698
1971	145		1991	561	18522
1972	170		1992	629	20173
1973	227		1993	653	21275
1974	195		1994	690	22403
1975	266		1995	780	23083
1976	367		1996	925	24617
1977	409	15893	1997	1037	22053
1978	381	16640	1998	953	19781
1979	351		1999	849	17056
1980	889	24201	2000	887	16469
1981	490		2001	1191	14929
1982	405	19867	2002	1045	14047
1983	424		2003	975	13611
1984	484	21186	2004	1471	15306
1985	-		2005	1674	14920
1986	449	19228	2006	1340	13136
1987	442		2007	1574	14219
1988	414	19456	2008	1601	11432
1989	439	19886	2009	1680	11939
			2010	1428	11062

Sources: Planning Institute of Jamaica, 1969-2011.